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This PhD project is a global, national and local history of the Indian National 
AIDS Control Programme (NACP) from 1986 to 2005. During my six-week 
research trip at the Rockefeller Archive Center (RAC) in Tarrytown, New York, I 
mainly examined the RAC’s holdings of the Ford Foundation’s files on AIDS in 
the Human Rights and Governance Program, Ford’s grants to Indian AIDS 
NGOs, as well as some material on the Rockefeller Foundation and other 
American foundations. These records have contributed an essential perspective 
on how Ford situated itself within the broader response of global health 
organisations and other international bureaucracies in regards to how the AIDS 
epidemic in developing countries should be dealt with. They demonstrate that the 
Ford Foundation, as an American philanthropy, had been an active voice in early 
discussions of how the disease should be tackled in developing world contexts. 
Most significantly, they show how Ford – as one of the first international 
agencies active before 1992 – had a distinct strategy for its AIDS work in India 
and its relationship with Indian civil society. This strategy was defined primarily 
by the Foundation’s perception that issues of social development and the social 
impact of AIDS were under-addressed by other international health agencies as 
well as the Government of India through its National AIDS Control Organisation 
(NACO).  
I. “The AIDS Challenge: A Ford Foundation 
Response” and Program Officer Reports: 
Insiders’ Reflections on the History of the 
Ford Foundation’s International AIDS 
Strategy and Work in India 
 
It is clear from the archival evidence that the Ford Foundation had a clear and 
dynamic strategy for its national and international AIDS activities vis a vis what it 
perceived were changing needs in developing countries as the epidemic 
progressed and the work of other international health bureaucracies, 
development agencies and bilateral donors. In this first section, I present an 
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overview of the Foundation’s U.S. and developing country AIDS activities 
drawing from internally produced and circulated documents at various stages. 
First is a 1987 Information Report prepared for the Board of Trustees titled “The 
AIDS Challenge: A Ford Foundation Response.” Second is a 1998 report by 
Marjorie Muecke of the Reproductive Health and Sexuality Program Office, 
which provides a perspective on the thematic connections between Ford’s 
domestic and international AIDS work. Third is a 50th Anniversary Monograph 
written in 2002 by Radhika Ramasubban and Bhanwar Singh Rishyasringa, 
which focuses primarily on the AIDS NGO network in India and the shift towards 
sexuality and reproductive rights. Finally, Jacob A. Gayle reviews Ford’s 
contributions to the global AIDS response in 2006 as the strategy was about to be 
up-scaled, showing a perspective on how Ford positioned itself in a dynamic 
landscape of other international AIDS actors.  
 
1987 Why AIDS was A Problem for Developing 
Countries – What Ford could Contribute 
 
From an information paper prepared for the Board of Trustees titled “The AIDS 
Challenge: A Ford Foundation Response,” we can see an early snapshot of Ford’s 
intended strategy.1 In June 1987, Ford appointed a group of consultants on both 
U.S. and foreign aspects of AIDS “from around the country from the fields of 
medicine, public health, law, and public policy” to help identify areas of “critical, 
unattended need” that Ford could become involved in. 2  The plan for Ford’s 
domestic work is well defined and articulated, as it clearly lays out the 
epidemiology of the crisis in various regions, the consequent social problems and 
the ongoing initiatives of other organisations. In terms of developing countries, 
the strategy was still somewhat vague, with the report simply stating that it 
strongly believed that Ford was uniquely positioned to: “[provide] information 
and logistical support in the developing countries to public health ministries and 
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non-governmental organizations concerned with developing fair and effective 
policies and preventive measures to contain the disease, and to share successful 
strategies.”3  
Chapter III, titled “AIDS in the Developing World: Potential for Foundation 
Action,” shows how at this point, Ford’s understanding of AIDS in the developing 
world and why it was an issue was still uncertain. Regarding the special need for 
AIDS work in such a context, Ford declares that the disease “threatens a broad 
cross section of the population in developing nations and compounds their 
already serious public health, development, and poverty problems.”4 The report 
notes that, in contrast to the United States, the epidemic in Africa was spread 
primarily by heterosexual transmission and affected both urban and rural 
populations equally. In regards to Latin America, particularly Brazil, the report 
presents more concrete evidence of the number of cases in men and women, also 
noting that there was significant discrimination against those infected with HIV 
and perceived risk groups such as homosexuals and sex workers. However, 
regarding the region of Asia, the report is the least clear, only stating that 
“[b]ecause of widespread intravenous drug use and prostitution associated with 
tourism in some countries of the region, … public health officials fear that AIDS is 
‘knocking at the door’ of Asia.” Interestingly, there is no mention of the 1980s 
debt crisis in developing countries, except to note that they are extremely poor. 
However, Ford was adamant in this 1987 strategy report on why it needed to get 
involved: “AIDS has serious consequences for most of the Foundation’s work 
aimed at alleviating poverty and promoting equal justice.”5 Not only that, AIDS 
was seen as a unique disease due to the “absence of preventive or curative 
medicines” and the way it would compound issues in developing countries’ health 
infrastructures due to its mode of transmission (sexual, blood transfusion, 
needles and breastfeeding) and the existing presence of diseases of poverty, such 
as tuberculosis and malnutrition. The link between AIDS, poverty and 
macroeconomic development is made in a very interesting way:  
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Thriving in an environment of poverty, AIDS threatens to push poor nations even 
deeper into poverty. In Central Africa, it is the productive members of society 
between ages twenty and fifty – particularly the educated elites – who are falling 
victim to the disease. Some policy makers are seriously concerned about the 
future viability of whole nations, not only in terms of net population losses but 
also in terms of losing essential human capital.6 
The report continues to denounce restrictive HIV testing policies for 
international travellers and immigrants in developing countries, declaring that 
“[h]ow societies choose to deal with the HIV infection, especially since the full 
dimensions of the problem are still unknown, may be the most important issue 
facing several Third World governments.”  
In the next section, the report details the activities of international agencies, 
focusing in particular on the World Health Organisation’s Special Programme on 
AIDS (SPA) and the United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID). Here we learn some critical information about the SPA before it became 
the Global Programme on AIDS (GPA). The goals of the SPA were to improve 
blood supply, prevent blood/sexual/prenatal transmission and research vaccines. 
Multilateral agencies like the World Bank and UN system members were happy 
for the WHO to take the lead. However, the report details that the programme 
was severely understaffed and underfunded. It notes that some donors were 
“likely to balk at WHO’s proprietary claims to the field” and have asked the SPA 
to allow UNDP and UNICEF in particular to have more of a say in programme 
design. While it notes that the US did provide donor funding to the WHO, USAID 
had begun a five-year contract of $28 million with a consortium of NGOs led by 
Family Health International to “provide technical assistance to developing 
countries in their AIDS prevention efforts.” USAID also funded $14 million for a 
communications program run through the Academy for Educational 
Development (AED) to provide information, education and communication (IEC) 
materials.   
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The report then turns to the landscape of international NGO work. It notes that 
organisations like the International Commission of Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Societies had focused on clean blood supply, while Save the Children, who 
worked on education and family planning organisations, had added HIV and STD 
prevention to their health communication work. It also notes that “somewhat 
belatedly,” development agencies had begun to view AIDS “not only as an 
international public health problem but also as a threat to the development 
process itself.”7 Within this, the time was ripe for private U.S. philanthropies to 
become involved, noting how the Rockefeller Foundation had funded research on 
sexual behaviour and heterosexual transmission of AIDS in Africa. So how was 
Ford to carve out a space for itself and make an impact in this landscape 
considering the problems in the developing world? 
Ford notes its advantages and disadvantages and designs its strategy accordingly. 
First, it could not draw from the financial resources and biomedical technical 
expertise necessary to become involved in vaccine and treatment research. It 
notes, “[i]n any event, such work is preeminently a function of governments, and 
is currently being led by public institutions in the United States and France.” 
Given their past experiences in health, however, where private foundations like 
Ford could leave their mark was in behaviour change and educational activities. 
The report notes the strengths of the Foundation being its existing relationships 
with human rights activists, government policy makers and social scientific 
programs at select universities in developing countries. Thus, it suggests that it 
could “help support selected activities in those domains complementing – but not 
controlled by – governmental mechanisms put in place by the national AIDS 
committees established by WHO.” 8  Education and behavioural change AIDS 
activities could also build from Ford’s previous international work in child 
survival and reproductive health, its network of community epidemiology and 
management in Asia, as well as its focus on human rights and connections with 
women’s organisations.  
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Here we note a few tendencies of the Ford Foundation that we will continue to 
see throughout the records: it stays away from hard economic as well as scientific 
and biomedical impact areas, focusing more on social issues like human rights, 
non-discrimination, sexuality and gender. Thus, it is reasonable to infer that the 
Foundation understood poverty in terms of social rather than economic 
development when it made the case for why it needed to be involved with AIDS in 
developing countries. Ford is also keenly protective of its autonomy and wary of 
complete control either by multilaterals or national governments. Thus, it aligns 
its expertise in work that was close to the community and potentially dealt with 
sensitive issues: 
Free of constraints that inhibit government assistance agencies and 
nongovernment organizations dependent on government funds, the Foundation 
could work flexibly and sensitively with indigenous groups on such delicate topics 
as patterns of sexual behaviour and how they might be modified to prevent 
AIDS.9  
Ford was aware of how foreign agencies were perceived in developing countries – 
as “European and American scientists who ‘parachute’ in to gather data on 
indigenous populations but are primarily concerned with the effect of AIDS on 
their own societies” – and hoped to leverage their position as a “long-established, 
nongovernmental institution” to bypass that.10 Finally, the report details their 
discussions with the Nairobi office on potential activities and notes that a grant 
had already been made through the Rio de Janeiro office to the Brazilian 
Interdisciplinary Association on AIDS. Thus, we know that before it was active in 
India, Ford had already had conversations with field offices in Africa and Latin 
America. 
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1998 Marjorie Muecke’s Overview of Ford’s National 
and International Activities 
 
Despite uncertainties in biomedical understandings surrounding the disease in 
1987 when Ford first began to make grants for AIDS activities, the Foundation 
was one of the most proactive organisations in addressing what it considered 
neglected social aspects of the disease. A 10 September 1998 draft transition 
memo report by Marjorie Muecke provides an insider perspective on the early 
history of Ford’s work.11 From 1987 to 1988, the total amount of funding granted 
was: $25,869,440 to U.S. activities; $18,696,171 to developing countries; and 
$2,280,500 worldwide. In terms of the domestic work, Muecke details how her 
predecessor Cristina Cuevas at the Rights and Social Justice Program focused the 
Foundation’s AIDS portfolio on “developing opportunities for the formulation of 
national policy.”12 After September 1993, when Muecke came to her position as 
the New York office’s Programme Officer for HIV/AIDS, she “shifted the 
Foundation’s approach from the content of AIDS policy to the participants (not) 
involved in the process of AIDS policy formation.”13 This was to reflect the fact 
that the disease had moved from the risk group of white middle class gay men to 
the general population, which would disproportionately affect the 
underprivileged. She states that she “proceeded to support activities that would 
change the infrastructures of exclusion that were accelerating the spread of the 
virus to women and youth, the poor, people of color, and other groups not 
benefiting from HIV prevention programs.”14 In terms of actual activities, the 
focus was on (a) community-based prevention efforts as well as (b) mass media 
education messages. Muecke focused the Foundation’s efforts on representing 
and including diverse and less-privileged voices, particularly those of women, in 
prevention and education policies. She also focused on reaching out to Black 
Church leaders and leaders in the African American Muslim community to help 
design appropriate health education messages and channels for treatment and 
counselling. Finally, she led the national strategy to identify and combat sources 
of stigma and discrimination, particularly concerning faith-based groups’ 
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perceptions of homosexuality. These elements comprised what Muecke named 
the “AIDS Politics of Inclusion” initiative.  
In regards to developing countries, Muecke certainly defends Ford’s attention to 
prevention as a stance against the “current focus of HIV/AIDS at the 
international level [which] is narrowly directed at medical treatments, 
pharmaceuticals and vaccine development, as evidenced by the recent 
International AIDS Conference in Geneva as well as by funding streams.”15 She 
also saw the need for Ford’s presence to balance the dominance of the United 
States and developed countries in setting the AIDS policy, research and program 
agendas. Developing countries needed to be “empowered” because domestic 
policy makers would take medical advances in treatment and reduced mortality 
rates as signs that the epidemic was abating and reduce international funding. 
She also initiated a new approach to Ford’s worldwide AIDS work, though the 
strategy here was necessarily less defined in order to be tailored to each location. 
Like the “Politics of Inclusion” work in the U.S., the Foundation sought to 
encourage approaches that would “integrate HIV/AIDS with other dimensions of 
development.” Unlike other organisations who resorted to funding highly vertical 
AIDS work, Muecke saw Ford’s experience with reproductive health as an asset in 
understanding and addressing HIV/AIDS in a more comprehensive way: 
Because of its leadership in the field of reproductive health, it has a critical role to 
play in strengthening the linkages between HIV/AIDS, reproductive health, 
reproductive rights, and development.16  
 
2002 Sexuality and Reproductive Health in India – 
50th Anniversary Monograph  
 
In 2002, Ford commissioned Radhika Ramasubban and Bhanwar Singh 
Rishyasringa to write a monograph titled “Sexuality and Reproductive Health 
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and Rights: Fifty Years of the Ford Foundation in India” on the occasion of Ford’s 
50th Anniversary. This document provides an excellent general overview of the 
work in the country. India was one of first overseas sites that Ford turned its 
attention to and in turn, the Foundation was one of the most active foreign 
agencies in initiating responses to AIDS in the country during the early period of 
1986 to 1992, which was the year AIDS activities were centralized through a 
National AIDS Control Organisation (NACO) and up-scaled with a substantial 
World Bank grant. During this time, Ford felt that the social aspects of AIDS had 
been under addressed. The disease as approached by the Indian Council of 
Medical Research (ICMR), which had taken charge, was viewed as “a medical 
problem of Western origin”: that India was “a monogamous society with high 
moral values and incapable of succumbing to a sexually transmitted disease 
(STD) like AIDS in a big way.” 17  Activities emanating from the Central 
Government thus focused on controlling sex workers and foreigners.  
“With few leads to proceed on, but recognizing the advantage of making an early 
start in this complex and unfamiliar area of sexual behaviour,” Ford identified 
public education about AIDS and the humane treatment of female sex workers as 
two areas needing immediate attention.18 The Foundation’s existing Community 
Epidemiology network served as the basis for NGO involvement. Saroj Pachauri, 
a Child Survival Program Officer, began looking for organisations Ford could 
persuade to address AIDS. In this early period before 1992, Ford made grants 
primarily to medical researchers at the institutions that had discovered the first 
national case and activist journalists pushing for legal protection of sex workers’ 
civil rights. In particular, the state of Tamil Nadu (where infection was first 
discovered) was a focus location as Ford built up a small network there consisting 
of Christian Medical College (CMC), the local Voluntary Health Association of 
India (VHAI) branch and the South India AIDS Action Programme (SIAAP). 
Furthermore, Ford organised a consultation in Bombay bringing together the 
ICMR, CMC, the Tata Institute of Social Sciences, the All-India Institute of 
Medical Sciences (AIIMS), the National Institute of Virology, media 
organisations and NGO health activists.  
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1992 was a seminal year because it was when the first phase of the National AIDS 
Control Programme began with a grant of $84 million from the International 
Development Association (IDA) of the World Bank and resulted in “opening the 
flood gates to external donor funding, most notably the World Bank, and helped 
legitimize the field somewhat.”19 Ford’s grantmaking took on a brisker pace as 
they focused primarily on Tamil Nadu and Maharashtra, the states with the 
highest prevalence levels. Despite its achievements, in 1994,  Ford commissioned 
an evaluation of its AIDS grantmaking in India by Ashoke Chatterjee and Dr 
Kusum Sahgal. Their findings were published in a report titled “HIV/AIDS 
Awareness & Control: Nineteen NGO Experiences in Delhi, Maharashtra, Tamil 
Nadu.”20 This report found that there were several unsustainable trends. Ford-
funded Indian AIDS NGOs put out fear-based health messages, worked in 
isolation and lacked mechanisms for evaluation and reflection. Around this time, 
the AIDS NGO scene in the country rapidly boomed in response to foreign 
donors’ interests and parallel to that came accusations of corruption and lack of 
regulation.21  
In light of this, the Anniversary Monograph states that Ford took a step back 
from its trailblazing strategy and initiated a more “pared down” and efficient 
approach to grantmaking in 1996. In this new strategy, Ford supported a core 
group of about fifteen capable NGOs mainly in Tamil Nadu and Maharashtra but 
also in the cities of Bangalore and New Delhi, which formed part of what it called 
“NETWORKS.” Members of NETWORKS included: CMC, the Naz Foundation 
India Trust (NAZ), Nalamdana, Y.R. Gaitonde Centre for AIDS Research and 
Education (YRG Care) and International Nursing Services Association India 
(INSA). While these organisations did receive funding from other sources, in all 
their varied activities, each member focused on preventing transmission; care, 
counselling and support; and establishing guiding principles based on the dignity 
of HIV patients. The Delhi-based Naz Foundation Trust (which conducted many 
coordinating and training activities for other more grassroots organisations) is an 
interesting example of Ford’s tendency to designate “intermediary organizations” 
in its grantmaking as a way to bring grassroots NGOs out of their isolation and in 
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collaboration with each other. According to the report, many of Ford’s 
NETWORKS alumni became well established and respected in the AIDS civil 
society community, with some members going on to work in national and 
international health policy. I will examine this in more detail in the third section. 
Perhaps influenced by their NETWORKS members’ focus on sexuality as a key 
social issue in AIDS, Ford began to address issues of sexuality in their health 
work, changing its Reproductive Health and Population Program to a Sexuality 
and Reproductive Health Program in 1994. In 1996, Geeta Misra joined the Delhi 
Sexuality Program with a strong background in NGO activism and Susan 
Berresford became President of the Sexuality and Reproductive Health field. As a 
result of this, grantmaking began to emanate from a stance of seeing HIV/AIDS 
within the framework of sexuality and sexual rights, the dignity and 
empowerment of women in sex work and protection against sexual violence. 
Accordingly, Ford funded sex worker’s rights projects with the Sonagachi in 
Calcutta and the SANGRAM in Maharashtra, as well as research on legal 
protections for sex workers and their rights with a grant to the Centre for 
Feminist Legal Research in Delhi.  
 
2006 Jacob A. Gayle’s Reflections on Ford’s Global 
Response to HIV/AIDS 
 
Finally, Jacob A. Gayle, the Deputy Vice President for HIV/AIDS, reflects on 
Ford’s twenty years of international AIDS work and the changing global 
epidemiological scenario in 2006 to make a case for the organisation’s renewed 
commitment to the global response.22 Despite 25 years of prevention and control 
as well as a decade of advances in highly active antiretroviral therapy (HAART), 
Gayle cites the UNAIDS statistic that there were over 40 million people living 
with HIV/AIDS around the world. The epidemic’s international epidemiological 
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profile grew more and more complex as infection spread from core risk groups to 
the generalized population. Furthermore, he deemed that there was a lack of 
political commitment and “[i]nsufficient human capacity for leadership and 
action further hamper[ing] progress, despite an exponential increase in financial 
resources for action.”23 Gayle clearly still sees Ford as a leader in initiating social 
change activities. By supporting key activities, issues and individuals early in the 
epidemic, he argues that Ford created a landscape in which healthy and 
constructive dialogue about taboo issues could be discussed. Ford’s impact could 
be felt most in countries like Brazil and India, who “owe much to the Foundation 
for their early successes in activating community/civil society participation in 
national HIV efforts.”24  
In light of such successes, Gayle discusses the reasoning behind why efforts 
needed to be up-scaled, not just intensified: “[i]n order to have ultimate success, 
local initiatives need to be brought to full scale, and they need to be financially 
secure over longer time frames. Furthermore, gaps still remain at local levels and 
they need to be addressed before the HIV response can be considered 
comprehensive.”25 He presents several potential initiatives Ford could pursue 
during the period of 2006 to 2010, including:  
- Senior decision-making and agenda-setting positions for representatives of 
aid recipient countries in institutions such as the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria, the World Bank and the US President’s Emergency 
Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) to bring them “up-to-date local knowledge, 
drawing on our local grantees’ experiences.”  
- Harnessing the application-potential of the knowledge Ford had gathered 
with diverse local experiences by bringing them together in multi-country 
mechanisms, allowing them to be implemented through agencies like 
UNAIDS, WHO and the Global HIV Prevention Task Force. Gayle states: 
“Ford’s global voice could be crucial in ensuring that local innovations are 
spread and implemented with human rights and equity in mind.”26 
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There are many more initiatives proposed, all aimed at taking a more “global,” 
coordinated and comprehensive approach. Thus, one of the most interesting 
themes that emerges from Gayle’s report is that by 2006, Ford was aware that the 
landscape of global AIDS had changed. It was much less fluid than in the early 
years and so the Foundation had to define a narrower and more focused role 
against organisations operating with different areas of expertise, amounts of 
funding and hierarchies of governance. Not only that, but as their respective 
epidemiological profiles evolved, developing countries had changing needs as 
well.  
However, the Foundation was well informed as to the activities and impacts of all 
the global AIDS actors, as well as how some were perceived in various countries. 
As narrated by Gayle, the Foundation took the stance that all organisations were 
bringing their talents together towards a common goal: not just preventing and 
mitigating the impact of the disease itself, but improving social development 
overall in developing world contexts. Within this, Ford clearly had a distinct 
understanding of the particular experience and expertise it brought to the table 
and obviously took pride in its active if relatively smaller role. This allowed Ford 
to be quite specific about where it could benefit the work of other organisations 
and vice versa. For example, given their social development orientation, Ford 
proposed that their grassroots work would progress more smoothly under an 
umbrella of authority in which the UN system would set the standards and 
regulations, while prominent international NGOs like Human Rights Watch with 
offices around the world would monitor violations of rights. And for its own 
institutional direction, Ford clearly saw the benefits of being “one of the few 
foundations with an HIV portfolio that includes both US domestic and 
international grant making”: this would allow streamlining of domestic and 
international efforts into “one global program.”27 As I detail later, this makes 
Ford a unique case study for my project because it demonstrates how global AIDS 
was transnational, national and local. 
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II. Gathering Information and Corresponding 
with Other Organisations: How to 
Understand and Mount a Strategic 
Response to AIDS in Developing Countries 
and India 
 
The 1987 strategy document, the 50th Anniversary Monograph, as well as Muecke 
and Gayle’s reflective reports, provide an illuminating and comprehensive, if 
rather polished overview of Ford’s national and global work from 1987 to 2006. 
Thus, it is important to also look into the “rougher” archival details of the 
information Ford was collecting and its correspondences with various 
organisations throughout this period. For American grant-makers like Ford who 
were interested in expanding their activities internationally, understanding how 
the epidemiology of the disease’s transmission differed in contexts outside the 
U.S. was key to their preparations in the late 1980s. Regardless of Ford’s 
extensive work in India since 1952, these records show how uncertain 
grantmakers were about what exactly AIDS was and what impact it would have. 
They paint a more in-depth step-by-step picture of how a philanthropic 
organisation like Ford confronted the advent of AIDS and framed its response. 
They tell us what kinds of information and individuals Ford considered accurate 
and reliable concerning the scenario of AIDS in developing countries, as well as 
what issues and collaborations they dropped. While some of these were meant 
more to advise the domestic programme, if aspects of them became part of the 
international and Indian programme, I have included them because I am also 
considering the question of whether Ford’s understanding of the U.S. epidemic 
influenced what they viewed as problems in India: i.e.: what did treatment cost 
mean in the U.S. vs. India? 
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Beyond Biomedical: Involving the Social Sciences with 
the SSRC 
 
From the early years, the Foundation did indeed seem to be particularly 
committed to issues outside the biomedical and scientific, gathering knowledge 
regarding social issues of anti-discrimination and human rights aspects. In 1987, 
Ford received a letter from the Social Science Research Council (SSRC), a New 
York-based non-profit organisation, about “initiat[ing] a conversation” for Ford 
support of a project on the “social consequences of the AIDS pandemic.”28 The 
SSRC often turned to private foundations rather than the American government, 
“whose support seemed more appropriate for the natural sciences,” and I think 
that tendency is well demonstrated here.29 In the face of uncertainty about a 
vaccine cure for the disease, the basis for the project was to understand and to 
project the “social, cultural, economic, and political consequences” of the AIDS 
epidemic. The SSRC makes a strong case for the need for perspectives from social 
scientific disciplines: “we are fixed on no idea other than on the necessity for a 
safeguard against a piecemeal approach in which information rarely crosses 
disciplinary lines or transcends a focus on a specified problem or issue.”30 After 
appointing a steering committee from professionals in the natural, medical and 
social sciences, the SSRC intended to begin three rather ambitious research 
projects. The first one would forecast the social consequences of the AIDS 
epidemic, “drawing on demographic and economic projections, epidemiological 
forecasts, historical analysis, and social theories.” The second one would develop 
social science policy capabilities to advise national governments and other “social 
institutions” to cope with the epidemic. The third one would “study the 
consequences of the epidemic outside the advanced industrial societies of the 
West in Brazil and Africa in particular.” To do this, they proposed “foster[ing] 
indigenous research in the affected societies in partnership with social scientists 
working on related problems in the U.S. and Western Europe.”31 The letter states 
that they had already done much work on a national scale but were looking to 
form a global network of research institutions. It is not clear if Ford did make a 
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grant to them for this project. However, from Ford’s strategy for AIDS prevention 
in developing countries, it would seem that the philosophy of the SSRC and the 
work they proposed deeply resonated with them. Almost a year later, the Council 
had a more clearly defined strategy and had already begun their work. They got 
back in touch with Shepard Forman, Director of the Human Rights and 
Governance Program, on 12 August 1988 to invite him to a meeting they would 
hold on 17 October in New York.32 
 
Cost and the Problem of AIDS in the Developing World  
 
It is clear from the copies of articles present in the Office Files of Shepard 
Forman of the Human Rights and Governance Program that the cost of AIDS in 
terms of their domestic and potential international programme was indeed a 
concern. A handwritten note saying “[i]n case you are interested” is sent from 
Denise Silver to Forman on 11 December 1987 with a copy of Jane E. Sisk’s “The 
Cost of AIDS: A Review of the Estimates” published in Health Affairs in summer 
1987.33 There are also copies of John K. Iglehart’s “Financing the Struggle Against 
AIDS,” a Journal of the American Medical Association piece titled “The 
Economic Impact of the First 10,000 Cases of Acquired Immunodeficiency 
Syndrome in the United States,” a 1987 Overseas Development Council piece 
called “AIDS and Poverty in the Developing World” and a piece by Daniel Fox 
called “The Cost of AIDS from Conjecture to Research.” These articles mostly 
focus on the U.S., examining the hospital and treatment costs HIV patients would 
have once their disease progressed and the consequent financial burden on the 
health care and insurance systems.  
There is no comment by Ford about these articles in the archival records that I 
have found, so we do not really know how they factored into the strategy. 
However, their presence in the archives raises a few questions concerning how 
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exactly Ford understood the problem of AIDS in a developing world context and 
how it conceptualized the need for particular types of action. Since the Alma Ata 
Declaration of 1978, a key discussion among multilateral health and development 
agencies as well as national governments concerned how developing countries 
should organise their health infrastructures given a context of limited resources. 
Alma Ata vs. Selective Primary Care was essentially a debate about how health, 
particularly infectious diseases, should fit within an economic development 
framework. This debate is thus also at the crux of critiques public health 
professionals in India have about their national AIDS programme: if cost given 
the resource-poor context was such an issue, why was the programme itself so 
expensive to run and so vertically oriented? The presence of these articles raises 
critical questions. Given the earlier epidemic in the U.S. and the fact that Ford 
was an American philanthropy active in domestic AIDS grantmaking quite early 
on, did information about macroeconomic cost of AIDS in relation to GDP seep 
into their understanding of what AIDS would cost developing countries? Or (and 
I hope to investigate this history in the future), was Ford’s understanding of why 
AIDS was devastating in India drawn from their past grantmaking relationships 
with Indian economists and social scientists who were commissioned to come up 
with more India-specific measurements of poverty in the early 1970s? In regards 
to themes and theories in history of international health, this raises the question 
of scale in historicizing the global AIDS response: how does a grassroots strategy 
fit into an understanding of top-down public health within a macroeconomic 
framework? As we will continue to see, Ford rarely engaged with national 
economic issues as part of the reasoning for their international health work.  
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Lincoln C. Chen and the Harvard School of Public 
Health 
 
As early as 1987, Ford was also gathering data from health experts in university 
research institutions. In a 3 March 1987 letter titled “Implications of AIDS for 
Ford Foundation Programming” to Ford Officer Oscar Harkavy from Lincoln C. 
Chen, Takemi Professor of International Health at Harvard University’s School of 
Public Health, Chen describes two studies by Harvard scholars on the 
implications of the epidemic in developing world contexts: one by Joe Potter and 
Mike Stoto of the Department of Population Sciences on the demographic impact 
of AIDS in Central African countries and another by David Hunter of the 
Department of Epidemiology “examin[ing] AIDS from many perspectives, 
including policy issues.” 34  Chen’s assessment was that despite “scientific 
uncertainty,” the AIDS epidemic in Africa and the United States would continue 
to expand. If Ford was to pursue a program on AIDS nationally and 
internationally, a sound public health strategy was essential. He encouraged Ford 
to draw from “historical and comparative experience…[g]enerating scientifically 
sound information and encouraging sober dialogue on these issues” in designing 
its approach.  
The way Chen positions how the AIDS crisis would be a devastating problem in 
developing countries is interesting. In addition to what is usually cited by policy 
literature at this time about the uncertainty of vaccination and drug treatment, he 
argues that AIDS was likely to become a major cause of death in Africa, 
“particularly among young adults.” This is similar to the macroeconomic 
argument made about AIDS and population control by the World Bank in the 
1993 World Development Report, linking how devastating a disease would be to 
the GDP of a resource-poor nation due to how many it would debilitate in the 
economically productive age group of 15 to 40. 35  For Ford’s influence in 
developing countries, Chen had the following advice: “[T[he major issue for an 
American philanthropy is international health interdependence.” 36  By 
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interdependence, Chen likely referred to the idea that health resources, just like 
diseases, could traverse national boundaries in an era of increasing transnational 
movement and connections.37 
Chen further elaborates on the impact AIDS would have domestically: that “fear-
induced” responses that violated ethical and legal codes do not work. He went on 
to identify the Foundation’s child survival and reproductive health programme as 
the best jumping off point for dealing with AIDS from a “health interdependence” 
framework: 
For any developing country, the issue naturally will be commensurate attention 
to other health problems (diarrhea, vaccine preventive infections, malnutrition, 
other sexually-transmitted diseases). Development of a health infrastructure will 
ensure that control and treatment for AIDS (when technologies are developed as 
they surely will be) can be made available at affordable costs to people. 
Investments today, therefore, in oral rehydration and vaccination programs that 
builds sustained capacity in LDC [least developed countries] are essential both on 
their own right but also to gain LDC cooperation today and to assist with their 
AIDS program in the longer-run. No other funding actors are pursuing these lines 
of potential program development.38 
Most significantly, Chen’s advice strikes a contrast to Ford’s later involvement in 
social and human rights issues at a very grassroots level. His recommendations 
are far more “top-down” and well versed in debates about macroeconomic costs 
of disease interventions and their impact on the general health infrastructure, 
ongoing between WHO, World Bank and other international actors since Alma 
Ata in 1978. Indeed, the two articles he includes with his letter lean towards more 
statistically and technically rigorous prevention work than the activities Ford 
later pursued with the Indian NGOs. In particular, one question that arises here 
is whether Ford’s understanding of how devastating the epidemic would be in 
India (which could “still be saved” since Asia had a “later” epidemic) came from 
David Hunter’s piece, which makes epidemiological projections about spread and 
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impact of AIDS in various African countries. In any case, it is not clear whether 
Chen felt his advice was specifically tailored to the position of a private American 
philanthropy like Ford among multilateral and bilateral international health and 
development agencies. Since the concept of a “multi-sectoral” response was new 
to global health interventions at the time that AIDS became a crisis, it is 
reasonable to assume no one was quite sure exactly how each actor with influence 
and resources at different levels could contribute to the global AIDS response.  
 
AIDS in India 
 
In 1987, less than a year after the first cases of HIV/AIDS were discovered in 
Tamil Nadu and Maharashtra states, Ford was gathering information on India’s 
epidemiological profile in preparation for their grant strategy in the country. A 21 
July 1987 inter-office memorandum from Marge Koblinsky to Bill Carmichael, 
John Gerhart, Shepard Forman and Oscar Harkavy attaches a copy of a 17 
January 1987 Lancet article by Jacob John of Christian Medical College Vellore 
titled “Prevalence of HIV Infection in Risk Groups in Tamil Nadu, India.”39 The 
reason for asking for John and his colleagues at Christian Medical College was 
because Ford was already funding a Community Epidemiology grant there. From 
this, Ford understood that AIDS was primarily spread through prostitutes, “a 
group that obviously sets the stage for possible dissemination through 
heterosexual spread.” 
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Gathering Experts: The Ford AIDS Consultative Group 
 
A handwritten note from Shepard Forman to Steve Marks on 28 January, 
probably in 1987 or earlier, reveals that Ford was looking for expertise on the 
“international legal and human rights dimensions of the AIDS Problem,” 
preferably without “a lot of calling around…w/ one or 2 discreet inquiries.”40 In 
March 1987, they were still searching for potential consultants, considering 
people such as Brooke Schoepf, a medical anthropologist and independent 
consultant who worked on the spread of AIDS in Zaire.41 
By June 1987, a letter from John D. Gerhart to Richard Horovitz and William 
Saint indicates that the Ford AIDS Consultative Group had been formed leading 
up to the December Board meeting (for which “The AIDS Challenge: A Ford 
Foundation Response” had been prepared) with Robert (Bob) Stein of 
Environmental Mediation International as lead coordinator.42 Stein and June 
Osborn of the University of Michigan School of Public Health would address 
international issues.43 Stein would also cover legal and rights aspects, as Osborn 
would also be in charge of overall health policy. John Marshall formerly with the 
National Center for Health Services Research would cover the aspects of cost and 
delivery and care. Jane Delgado of the National Coalition of Hispanic Health and 
Human Services Organization would cover education and health communication. 
Mychelle Farmer of the Adolescent Sexually Transmitted Diseases Clinic at 
University of Maryland Hospital would cover AIDS and teens. Richard Merritt of 
the Intergovernmental Health Policy Project and Richard Dunne of Gay Men’s 
Health Crisis would address agenda building. Michael Seltzer, an independent 
consultant of the Foundation Center who authored “Meeting the Challenge: 
Foundation Responses to Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome,” would also 
support by leading his own consultancy on the non-profit sector, mapping 
funding strategies for the expanding health crisis.44 In a 5 June 1987 letter to 
Forman, Seltzer says “The addition of Ford to the small, but rapidly growing, list 
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of foundations acting against AIDS is very heartening…Given the Foundation’s 
international scope, its longstanding concern for minorities and their civil rights, 
and its resources, the Foundation is in a position to make a unique contribution.” 
Other individuals served as resource consultants, such as King Holmes of the 
Harborview Medical Center in Seattle who researched AIDS in Kenya.45 
The agenda at this stage was still quite open as the Consultative Group had their 
first meeting on 2 June 1987 in Washington D.C.46 Stein in his coordinating role 
encourages the consultants in an update letter to “get in touch with one another 
and share potential contacts, existing material, and use one another’s expertise to 
the common good.”47 He asks that they “scope out the issues to be addressed, 
then identify what other work is now ongoing or is proposed and who is doing it, 
and… devise a program based on the above which will give the Foundation an 
opportunity to provide useful support to institutions in the areas described.”48 
However, what was certain was the overall guiding principle: that “AIDS is a 
disease which is working significant and long term changes to society.”  
Gerhart’s Comments on Developing Country Strategy 
By September 1987, the consultants’ recommendations for Ford’s AIDS agenda 
were mostly in place and a few individual grants had already been made. 
Domestic priorities included: quality of life and care issues, legal issues and 
shaping public agendas.49 The goals for the national-level work appear to be well 
articulated and extremely detailed here as they were in “The AIDS Challenge” 
Information Report presented to the Board that December. However, the sections 
on the international and developing country strategies were apparently even 
sparser than they were in the final Report to the Board. John D. Gerhart’s in-
depth comments in a 14 September 1987 letter to Forman on the paucity of the 
recommendations for Ford’s international work shows us a crucial moment in 
which we see the Foundation conceptualising why it needed to be active in 
developing countries. First, Gerhart starts by saying that “[the consultants’ 
report] would benefit from a little more description of the extent and implications 
 
24 R A C  R E S E A R C H  R E P O R T S  
of the epidemic, such as are contained in the Panos paper.”50 The Panos Institute, 
a London-based journalism/think tank/non-governmental organisation, had 
authored an influential report titled “AIDS in the Third World” in 1986 on the 
implications of AIDS in developing countries. Chapter 5 titled “Africa: AIDS and 
the Shrinking Development Dollar” in particular talks about how AIDS will 
impact the national economies of African countries, which is probably what he 
was referring to.51 Gerhart goes on to say:  
It would be helpful to give some description about why AIDS is going to be much 
more devastating in the developing countries (poorer general health, poorer 
health care, many more opportunistic diseases, untested blood supplies, 
penchant for reuse of needles in inoculations, etc.). It does make the important 
point that health expenditures are lower per capita than even the costs of a blood 
test, but it could make this stronger: emphasis must be put on prevention 
because it is simply impossible to cover the costs of care.52  
Simply saying that developing countries allocated less of their GDP on public 
health and that they were poorer was not enough. He asked that they be more 
specific and detailed about the biomedical and epidemiological particulars of 
AIDS, noting that King Holmes, their Kenya expert, had commented verbally in 
conversation with them on the issue of the threat of communicable diseases such 
as tuberculosis after the immune system was disabled, compounding the health 
crisis. Gerhart states that the Foundation needed to better understand how AIDS 
was a problem in developing countries both epidemiologically and 
macroeconomically to formulate a more appropriate strategy that demonstrated 
their “comparative advantage.” He offers some preliminary thoughts: 
I see little benefit in our taking on issues of international testing requirements, 
visas, etc. since, as the report points out, this has little effect on transmission, and 
also has the high visibility, is contentious, involves diplomatic feelings, etc. I 
would think we would have little to offer on that score. Likewise, I think it is 
expensive and pretentious for us to take a leading role in coordinating either 
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donors or government agencies since we are a minor actor and not well 
established in the health field. We have no capacity whatsoever to develop an 
international health services corps, or an international data base, nor are we an 
appropriate agency to do these functions.53 
Gerhart goes on to discuss whether Ford’s U.S. work carried any policy relevance 
for their developing country programme, which he concludes by saying that the 
contexts were simply too different: developing countries did not have the 
concepts of job security, health insurance, testing policies, all of which were key 
strategic areas of Ford’s more detailed American AIDS activities. Therefore, 
Gerhart recommends that they pursue behavioural research, information and 
education, prevention and targeting of high-risk populations. In his opinion, 
Ford’s comparative strengths in this field were that first, as a non-governmental 
organisation, they were “less vulnerable to political sensibilities,” and second, 
they could make use of the strong linkages with social science research 
communities. He concludes by reiterating: “I do not believe we should get heavily 
involved in the care and cost of care issues, since this is unlikely to have any real 
impact on the ultimate spread or effects of the disease in the poorest countries.”54 
Thus, through Gerhart’s comments, we can see the process behind how Ford 
determined its capacity for impact accordingly for developing countries. 
Furthermore, this letter shows that at least one Ford official felt that their 
developing country AIDS programme had to be completely divorced from their 
U.S. activities.  
 
Discussions with the WHO from 1987 to 1988 
Potential Collaboration 
On 7 August 1987, there is an inter-office memo from Shepard Forman to various 
program directors about his meetings with WHO officials: Jonathan Mann, SPA 
Director, and Axel Mundigo, social science researcher with the Human 
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Reproduction Program (HRP).55 The purpose of the meeting was to exchange 
information about their respective organisations’ activities and for Ford to get 
comments from Mann and Mundigo concerning their upcoming strategy. 
Mundigo, previously with Ford as a sociologist and demographer, was speaking 
with Forman about the inclusion of AIDS-related research on sexual behaviour in 
the WHO’s HRP. In terms of Ford’s capabilities, Mundigo had said that their 
advantages were their involvement in rights and policy issues. He gave Forman a 
few examples of quarantine and the isolation of HIV infected people, advising 
that “the Foundation should carve out a special and highly visible effort that 
stresses rights and ethics.”56  Mann was also supportive of Ford focusing on 
human rights and protections as well as the wellbeing of people living with AIDS. 
This is not surprising given that Mann was developing a philosophy of the 
compatibility of human rights and global public health through his leadership of 
the GPA until 1990 and later in establishing the Francois-Xavier Bagnoud Center 
for Health and Human Rights at Harvard Public Health in 1993.57  
However, according to Shepard, Mann also saw a “larger and more 
comprehensive role for the Foundation.” He describes Mann thus: “He is a highly 
articulate and knowledgeable advocate on the subject and welcomes the 
Foundation’s involvement.” Here we see how Ford might have situated itself as 
support for the core national program directed by the WHO: 
Mann urged us to concentrate our efforts in areas not being covered by others or 
to seek ways to complement activities already underway. For example, he began 
by noting that WHO is already coordinating the exchange of educational 
materials between countries and the provision of technical information to 
national AIDS commissions. The Foundation could, however, play a role in 
funding evaluators of educational efforts and surveys on societal attitudes and 
responses to AIDS that would be extremely useful in developing national 
programs.58 
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More specifically, Mann suggested that Ford could support four main areas: 
education, technical assistance, rights issues and health care delivery. In 
education, Mann was concerned that media materials were being prepared but 
that messages were not reaching people, particularly homosexual males in poor 
urban settings in developing countries. He suggested that Ford could help fund 
gay men’s organisations in the industrialized world to reach these communities. 
In terms of health care delivery, he advised that Ford identify organisations that 
could assist in delivering humane care. He was also keen on the idea of 
unemployed people living with AIDS receiving training as professional 
caregivers. 
The most interesting section concerned Ford’s capabilities in human rights. 
Mann felt Ford could be most impactful by focusing on rights because “1) no one 
else is doing it and 2) relative success or failure of our efforts to combat AIDS will 
depend on prevailing social attitudes and how we deal with the afflicted.”59 Mann 
was keen to avoid “authoritarian approaches” to the AIDS crisis, which would 
isolate the HIV-infected and people with AIDS (PWA). Thus, he urged Ford to 
fund a series of studies on attitudes to AIDS of various sections of society in about 
twenty countries, including information on legal codes, national policies and how 
HIV infected and PWA were treated. “Are they rejected by their families? Fired 
from their jobs? Kept from school?” This would “provide the context for 
developing a productive atmosphere for working with the disease.” 60 
Furthermore, the WHO was also concerned with HIV screening and restrictions 
on international travel and potential human rights abuses, suggesting that Ford 
keep tabs on legal developments concerning this area. 
In another interesting section, Mann said the Ford Foundation could potentially 
contribute towards technical information but in terms of small donations, not 
through any activity. Mann told Shepard that the WHO was collaborating with 
the World Bank to generate information about health care costs and did not 
believe there was need for Ford involvement, although “some funds from Ford or 
other private donors might hasten the results.”61 The main thing for developing 
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countries was to make a context-appropriate model for understanding health cost 
on a per capita care basis. This would be supplemented by continuous 
improvements in surveillance and reporting systems, improving the quality of 
epidemiological data. Mann told Shepard that “[s]imply predicting aggregate 
costs generates the wrong kind of response and is not useful in any case.”62 He 
relates that the WHO had begun a project led by James Chin, a social scientist, to 
undertake a “Surveillance, Forecasting and Impact Assessment.” This was meant 
to develop a set of scenarios that could be used for African and Asian countries, 
as researchers in Copenhagen had already been working on a model for Europe.63 
Rather than forecasting on a sector-by-sector basis (how HIV impacted the 
education sector, industry, etc.), there was need for consensus on national rates 
of mortality, morbidity and transmission. Shepard then told Mann about the 
work the SSRC was proposing to do and said he “reacted with interest.” Mann 
requested a meeting with those working on this project to coordinate and 
improve efforts because he felt the WHO was “the proper organization to do this 
(governments aren’t suspicious of them and want the data they can provide).”64 
There is a theme emerging here on the differences between what is appropriate 
for a multilateral and what is appropriate for a private foundation to do. 
Decision to remain autonomous 
On 13 October 1987, there is an interoffice memorandum from Forman to 
“Distribution” on the WHO’s coordination of global and national AIDS activities. 
He describes his meeting with Terry Mooney, an official seconded to the WHO 
from the Canadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs who was discussing with potential 
donors leading up to the WHO’s fourth Meeting of Participating Parties to take 
place on 12 to 13 November 1987.65 Shepard expresses his discomfort with the 
WHO taking the role of lead international coordinator of all governmental, 
intergovernmental and civil society work. We can also see the origins of why Ford 
turned to make links with civil society. He describes the WHO’s intention to 
formally establish its leadership and coordinating role by creating a global 
commission on AIDS and a Commission of Participating Parties. Furthermore, 
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the WHO would establish National AIDS Control Programmes with the health 
departments of national governments, who would set the agenda for research and 
action on their respective national AIDS crises, “with the expectation that all 
external funding would be directed through them.” We also find a copy of a draft 
proposal for the WHO SPA Joint Management Structure, as well as the plan for 
Comprehensive Coordination of Global and National AIDS Activities in this grant 
file, which states that: “All governmental, intergovernmental and non-
governmental efforts, whether scientific, technical or financial, must be 
consistent with and supportive of WHO’s Global Strategy on AIDS as approved by 
the World Health Assembly.”66 While Mooney was keen for Ford to sit on the 
Committee of Participating Parties, Shepard apparently told him outright: “a 
policy that limited grantmaking to agencies and activities approved by an official 
body such as a National AIDS Control Programme would run counter to the 
Foundation’s general policy of independence in grantmaking.” 67  Besides its 
philosophy on autonomy, it would be interesting to find out precisely what it was 
that Ford disliked so much about working on core programmes with national 
governments.  
What we do know, on the other hand, is exactly how one Ford official felt about 
collaboration with the WHO. On 23 October 1987, there is an interoffice 
memorandum from Oscar Harkavy to Forman about his 13 October letter.68 
Harkavy expresses his strong feelings against the WHO’s complete ownership of 
the global AIDS response: “I became increasingly irritated as I read the WHO 
document. It claims complete control for WHO over all international AIDS 
activities, as is WHO’s posture on all health matters.”69  He gives some past 
examples, in which diarrheal disease research centres of developing countries 
such as Bangladesh “fought valiantly” to avoid being overwhelmed by the WHO 
“despite the latter’s determined effort to take it over.” He notes that WHO 
leadership in the Human Reproduction Program also resulted in bad relations 
between European and American donors. The only program in disease control 
that managed to avoid “complete domination” was the Tropical Disease Research 
(TDR) Programme in which the WHO shared formal sponsorship with the World 
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Bank and the UNDP. “In sum,” he ends, “the WHO document is a heavy-handed 
bid for absolute control of all AIDS work. Based on experience with other WHO 
efforts, we should collaborate on the ground, but maintain our own independence 
of operation.”70  
Contact again for a database 
As Ford’s approach on rights and social issues solidified about a year later, they 
were again in contact with the WHO about a comprehensive database on rights 
work by international organisations in the developing world. On 12 August 1988, 
there is an interoffice memorandum between Steve Linick and Bill Carmichael, 
Shepard Forman and John Gerhart about Ford making a possible grant to the 
WHO’s Global Programme on AIDS (GPA).71 As always keen to “avoid duplicative 
grantmaking,” Ford was looking for information about other international donors 
working on AIDS in developing countries. Linick had contacted Roy Widdus and 
Manuel Carballo, programme coordinators of the WHO’s GPA, requesting 
information about the human rights aspects of the disease, who replied that there 
could be information in their headquarters but that it would be in a “rather 
unsystematic fashion.” Linick answered mentioning the possibility of Ford 
making a small grant to help generate the data, to which Widdus replied 
suggesting a joint WHO/Ford effort in “obtaining the necessary information.” 
What came out of this potential collaboration is not clear from the records. Thus, 
these early correspondences with the WHO show how Ford considered working 
as support for the core program but found the WHO’s desire for proprietary 
management too stifling. However, it is reasonable to assume that Ford took 
some inspiration from the WHO officials in their international strategy for AIDS, 
in particular Mann and his affinity for human rights.   
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Summary 
 
While the history of global AIDS has often been told as one of institutional 
responses, these records show that it was also one of individuals and their areas 
of expertise operating within institutional cultures. Furthermore, they show how 
when corresponding with the WHO or discussing the central programme 
emanating from the World Bank’s lending, Ford presented an institutional face of 
a smaller American philanthropy that styled itself as an expert on grassroots 
human rights and social development issues. While some of these 
correspondences give us a good understanding of where Ford fit among 
international health organisations, development agencies and national 
governments, others remind us of a smaller national-level circle of influence that 
the Foundation operated in. In the early years of around 1986 to 1988, private 
American philanthropies were starting to identify the areas of the domestic AIDS 
crisis they would each address. Within this environment, Ford was unique for 
pushing both a domestic and an international strategy. Whether it managed this 
successfully is not a question to investigate here, but tracing the activities of Ford 
presents a fascinating case study of precisely how the history of global AIDS is 
international, national and local. Part of global AIDS is the history of one 
American philanthropy with equally substantial domestic and international 
programmes that had to present one face to its philanthropic colleagues and 
another to international health bureaucracies. And as we explore Ford’s 
relationship with Indian civil society in the next section, we will see how they 
believed social issues relating to AIDS were best solved by the NGO-sector due to 
their proximity, understanding and influence with local and sometimes 
marginalized communities.  
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III. Looking into the Grant Files 
 
In this section, I examine in depth several case studies of the Ford Foundation’s 
grants to Indian AIDS NGOs. Because of the sheer volume of the number of 
grants and materials within them, I will mainly focus on the early years and 
significant members of NETWORKS, for which I mainly draw from the 
recommendations/requests for grant action sections. I also used as background 
material AIDS and Civil Society: India’s Learning Curve by Radhika Ramsubban 
(who was a co-author of Ford’s 50th Anniversary Monograph I mentioned earlier) 
and Bhanwar Rishyasringa. They examine six of the most prominent Ford funded 
NGOs in their 2005 publication.72  
 
1990-1993 Earliest Grants: CMC and IHO 
 
The first grants were made in 1990 to Christian Medical College Vellore (CMC) 
and the Indian Health Organisation (IHO) in Bombay. As I mentioned earlier, 
Ford was already supporting the institution through an existing epidemiology 
program and got their initial understanding of the AIDS epidemic from Jacob 
John, as evidenced by the presence of his Lancet article in Forman’s files. These 
grants were made from the Population Program of the Developing Country 
Programs Division led by Officer Saroj Pachauri. Ford’s early strategy with these 
two were to support “innovating experimental education, communication and 
training programs for AIDS.” 73  CMC was to build an AIDS Reference and 
Resource Centre and IHO was to establish an Indian AIDS Foundation in 
Bombay. In the précis for this initial series of grants, Ford sets a global context:  
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The AIDS pandemic has created a new agenda of public health concerns 
worldwide that requires a complex and unprecedented range of institutional 
innovations. It has brought with it an affirmation of the interdependence between 
countries and the need for addressing problems through joint action by 
biomedical and social scientists.74 
It goes on to state that the brunt of the impact in the developing world was in the 
regions of Africa and Latin America and that “India and other Asian countries 
have, therefore, a unique opportunity to face this challenge at an early stage when 
the magnitude of the problems is still manageable.”75 Furthermore, the advantage 
was that Asian countries could learn from all other regions that faced an earlier 
epidemic – the only obstacle was denial that AIDS was an issue. This confirms 
what we learned from the 1987 strategy, that organisations seeking to work in 
India, which is designated part of the Asia region and “late to the epidemic,”76 
could still be saved with heavy emphasis on prevention. Furthermore, there is the 
suggestion that their epidemiological profile would be similar to Africa and Latin 
America. The précis firmly establishes that AIDS was not just a health issue: “it 
also impacts on issues of human rights, governance and public policy, education, 
social services and the quality of life.” 
It notes the sero-surveillance focused activities emanating from the Government 
of India (GOI) to reflect the issue of infected blood from donors in the major 
cities of Madras (now Chennai) and Bombay. In October 1985, the Indian Council 
of Medical Research (ICMR) established an AIDS Task Force and built up a 
network of clinical and sero-surveillance to gather epidemiological data, which 
had since expanded to include the collaboration of state health services. ICMR 
with support from the WHO also established a Central AIDS Unit to coordinate 
supplies, quality control and evaluation. The précis states that in addition to 
these activities, there was a pressing need for the Indian AIDS prevention 
program to include education and awareness campaigns. This was why the New 
Delhi office was making its first grants to these organisations for these activities, 
building on Ford’s existing research and service programs on STDs and women’s 
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reproductive health in rural and tribal women in Maharashtra and urban slum 
women.  
Ford chose IHO due to its advocacy, education and counselling work on behalf of 
prostitutes, drug addicts and hijras (transvestites) in the red-light districts and 
city slums of Bombay as well as rural and tribal areas in Maharashtra and 
neighbouring states. It also pioneered AIDS awareness and education through 
mass media and seminars even before the first national case was discovered. Its 
director Dr I.S. Gilada was a member of ICMR’s AIDS Task Force and worked at 
J.J. Hospital, an institution in Bombay that provided AIDS and STD treatment 
and control services. The IHO was to establish an Indian AIDS Foundation, 
which would disseminate information on AIDS through a variety of print media 
and television channels; put together education and training programs; and 
provide community-level education, counselling and care programs through 
mobile clinics in the red-light districts of Bombay. 
CMC, home to a highly-respected Virology Department, was not just a node in the 
nation’s epidemiological surveillance system and one of the four ICMR 
designated National AIDS Virus Reference Centres. It also a Ford grant recipient 
for the establishment of an Epidemiology Resource Centre, as mentioned in the 
first section. I found Ford’s reasoning for why they wanted to work with this 
institution interesting:  
It combines technical competence with missionary zeal to serve the poor and the 
disadvantaged and, through its outreach programs, makes great efforts to provide 
health care to those who do not have access to hospital facilities. Its Community 
Health and Development (CHAD), Rural Unit for Health and Social Affairs 
(RUHSA) and other outreach efforts, provide excellent examples of how research 
can effectively be translated into relevant program strategies for addressing the 
health needs of the poor.77 
Why the focus on poverty as part of health?78 While this is not the place to fully 
investigate this question, I would like to mention that one critique of global 
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health and disease control programs is that they do not work because they fail to 
address underlying questions of systematic poverty. While this may not be a 
counterexample per se, it is key to consider how Ford conceptualized their work 
in health while acknowledging the context of poverty.  
It is also interesting that this new AIDS centre that the CMC would build was to 
focus on psychological assessment and counselling of HIV positive people and 
people with AIDS. It had three main objectives: first was to construct a database 
on psycho-social aspects of AIDS and to distribute this information through a 
newsletter; second was to develop programmes for training health workers and 
non-health professionals like social workers and teachers to help those with HIV 
and AIDS cope with psycho-social problems; and finally, it was to organize a 
forum to discuss policy by bringing together activists, researchers and other 
professionals to “develop specific recommendations and guidelines for 
dissemination to Indian audiences.”79 Thus, Ford’s first foray into AIDS work in 
India took the form of grants to two organisations that were already active in 
national AIDS work. They were both also key nodal centres in national 
epidemiological information-gathering with experience in treatment and 
counselling. The content of the work was surprisingly courageous and forward 
thinking, as activities such as psychological counselling presumes people are 
already infected with HIV and require not just treatment but also psychological 
care. This initial group of grants to these two organisations can be viewed as Ford 
“dipping its toes” and exploring the possibilities of the work it could do. 
 
1991-1995 Group 2  
 
The next generation of grants were made in two main groups. One set comprised 
of three organisations starting in 1991 for a period of 2 to 3 years, which were 
International Nursing Services Association of India (INSA), Population Services 
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International (PSI) and Voluntary Health Association of India (VHAI). Another 
set of five between 1 and 5 years comprised of grants to five groups, which were 
the Trust for the Rights of the Underprivileged in Society Today, PREPARE India 
Rural Reconstruction and Disaster Response Service, All India Institute of 
Medical Sciences (AIIMS), South India AIDS Action Programme (SIAAP) and 
Sevadham Trust. Ford conceptualized its role thus: 
Additional support for AIDS programs could be critical to stimulating interest 
among NGOs and state governments in India. Such support would prepare the 
groundwork urgently needed to develop local expertise and attract donor funds. 
At this time, when other donors have yet to gear up support for AIDS work and 
when the state governments, NGOs and researchers have little on-the-ground 
experience with the multiple dimensions of the problem, the Foundation could 
make a significant contribution.80 
During this period, Ford was convinced that behaviour change activities should 
take precedence as the major element in prevention and Tamil Nadu and 
Maharashtra would be the regional focus as high prevalence states. The 
recommendation for grant/FAP action in the précis states that “[a]t the heart of 
prevention is persuading people to change risky sexual behavior” and cites the 
reasons why government efforts have been unsuccessful so far in controlling the 
spread of HIV is because of the “difficulty in bringing about behavioural changes 
in sexual relationships.” 81  Ford’s solution to this was to work with 
nongovernmental organisations because of their proximity to the community and 
their understanding of local culture. In fact, NGO-led behaviour change activities 
with high-risk groups should be a key element in prevention: “As AIDS 
prevention and control measures require the active participation of communities, 
NGO involvement is being increasingly sought by governments and donors in the 
fight against the spread of HIV/AIDS.”82  
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1994 Mid-point Assessment: Chatterjee and Sahgal on 
“HIV/AIDS Awareness & Control: Nineteen NGO 
Experiences in Delhi, Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu” 
 
As mentioned in the overview, in 1994, Ford commissioned Dr Kusum Sahgal 
(Professor at the Maulana Azad Medical College in New Delhi) and Ashoke 
Chatterjee (Senior Faculty at the National Institute of Design in Ahmedabad) to 
conduct a survey of nineteen grantees of the Foundation in the cities of Delhi, 
Pune, Vellore, Bombay, Nasik and Madras/Chennai. Here I will draw out a few 
interesting points that were not evident about the report in Ramasubban and 
Rishyasringa’s Anniversary Monograph. The survey reportedly was an 
assessment of the quality of the IEC (information, education and 
communication) materials that these organisations had produced, taking into 
account “how unique are the social, cultural and economic environments within 
which HIV/AIDS activities are conducted.”83 Despite citing numerous areas in 
which improvement was needed, in many places it acknowledges that these 
organisations were working in an uncertain and unstable terrain, faced with 
opposition from those who resent AIDS work as a “megabuck bandwagon, with 
lucrative appeal which attracts opportunism and masks other urgent needs.” 
There was no manual for how to do HIV/AIDS intervention, which made these 
NGOs’ work particularly difficult in the “absence of a coherent and sustained 
support system.”84 It commended these organisations’ choice to “enter a service 
in which complexity, frustration and disappointment is guaranteed.” Thus, their 
first challenge was to “build a stamina for perseverance and suffering capable of 
being tested at every turn.”85 Sahgal and Chatterjee’s survey offers the following: 
The consultants have been impressed by the sincerity of purpose which has 
marked each one of their encounters, and the quality of human fortitude which is 
the badge of so many persons serving and affected by the HIV/AIDS crisis. In the 
long term, this is perhaps the most important resource India has toward meeting 
an uncertain HIV/AIDS future. The significant of the quality of this human 
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resource goes well beyond one sector. It is a commitment to a holistic, integrated 
understanding of health, environment and empowerment. It would seem of the 
utmost importance that this unity of purpose be actively nourished as well as 
shared. A band of some 20 grantees may appear of little significance as a number, 
yet each one of them is ideally placed as a catalyst and as a role model. Their 
demonstration can be significant, and is certainly the most important 
contribution the Ford Foundation has made, and can continue to make, in what 
must be the most difficult challenge India’s health systems have faced since 
Independence.86 
 
“Intermediary” NGOs in NETWORKS: Case study of 
The Naz Foundation 
 
As mentioned in the overview, Ford changed its strategy in 1996 to be more 
efficient, focused and selective in its grantmaking, after a wave of corrupt NGOs 
due to the immense amount of AIDS funding made available. It also wanted to 
bring its AIDS work under a reproductive health approach. At this stage, Ford’s 
understanding of India’s epidemiological profile was that it would become the 
“epicentre of the global HIV/AIDS epidemic,” citing a UNDP study in which it 
was predicted that the country would have 4 million recorded cases of HIV/AIDS 
by the end of the century.87 Thus, the HIV threat was particularly serious “as 
India struggles to cope with the heavy burdens of poverty and ill-health.”88 The 
epidemic had now spread to the general population and without a cure, the most 
important activities should focus on prevention and within that, the promotion of 
safe sexual behaviours. However, prevention was difficult in India because (i) the 
epidemic had not progressed far enough in the country for Indians to witness on 
a wide-scale the suffering due to progression of HIV infection to AIDS and (ii) 
discussion about sexuality and sexual behaviours in the country was taboo. While 
this is not the place to investigate this here, one issue Indian public health 
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professionals have critiqued over the years is the overestimation by global health 
agencies of the country’s prevalence rates.89 It is interesting here in 1996 that 
Ford based its prevention activities based on such statistics, that India was 
essentially sitting under an “explosive” volcano. The question is, as Ford went 
further into ground-level grassroots activism, whose statistics informed their 
understanding of the “need” for their kind of work? 
That year, Ford made a set of four grants to what it called “intermediary” or 
“support” organisations, which meant they would train other more local 
grassroots organisations in carrying out their AIDS activities. These nodal 
organisations were meant to “play pivotal roles in the critical areas of training, 
technical assistance, research and documentation, information sharing and 
dissemination, and organisational capacity building.” 90  They were the Naz 
Foundation (India) Trust based in New Delhi, the Y.R. Gaitonde Medical, 
Educational and Research Foundation in Madras, International Nursing Services 
Association of Bangalore and Counselling and Allied Services for AIDS in 
Bombay. Of these, I am particularly interested in the Naz Foundation as my 
fieldwork is based in Delhi. Founded and led by Anjali Gopalan in 1994, the Trust 
would continue to be a reliable node in Ford’s network of AIDS NGOs. The 
Foundation has become well known in India and internationally for its activism 
in protecting gay, lesbian and transgender rights in a country where 
homosexuality is still illegal.91  
In the proposal for the first grant Ford received from the Naz dated 12 December 
1995, we can see exactly how the organisation positioned itself in relation to the 
central national programme.92 In the opening section titled “An Urgent Need,” we 
can see that the Naz was also struggling with imprecise figures emanating from 
various sources about the national prevalence rates:  
The Global Program on AIDS (WHO), Harvard AIDS Institute, the Indian 
Government and various non-governmental agencies give figures that range from 
several hundred thousand to several million infected persons. What can safely be 
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said is that unless effective steps are taken quickly, the battle against HIV 
transmission in India will be lost.93  
What is interesting in the above text is that I have yet to come across a case where 
Ford acknowledged the disagreements over epidemiological calculation methods 
for national prevalence rates. Yet the Naz as its grant recipient was aware of this 
debate, likely due to its members regularly tracking this information in literature 
produced by multiple multilateral agencies (WHO, UNDP, etc.) and perhaps also 
influenced by critiques of Indian public health professionals. This raises the 
theme in historicizing global AIDS of: whose statistics informed where need and 
what kind of need is perceived? It also raises a question concerning a grantmaker 
and recipient’s relationship: who was the expert here?  
The Naz’s proposal goes on to detail six reasons why behaviour-changed focused 
prevention strategies had not been effective so far, the most significant for my 
project being that first, most programmes did not address the taboo issue of 
sexuality and second, that the people carrying out these activities see HIV as 
“happening to someone ‘out there’,” misunderstanding the “sexual and drug 
using reality of our society.” The few organisations committed to enacting “multi-
level” attitude change were of “a new breed” and had not had enough time to 
establish the roots that would allow them to be effective.94 
Given this scenario, the Naz believes the catalyst for scaling up prevention would 
have to come from voluntary organisations themselves as they “play a significant 
role in promoting human development.” It sets the current scene for NGO 
activity in the country, stating that it was only after the Seventh Five Year Plan 
that the government began to acknowledge the crucial role that civil society 
played. NGOs in all shapes and forms – “from the grassroots level to the highest 
levels of policy formulation…[w]hatever may be the interaction with the 
government, whether collaborative or confrontational” – can make a vital 
contribution:  
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The role and involvement of NGOs as a catalyst for changes in attitude and 
behavioural patterns is a vital factor for the success of national programs. 
Because of their in depth communication with the community, NGOs have 
greater credibility and encourage a more participatory approach which is 
conducive to a change in attitudes and behaviour.  
In addition to being an instigator of change, the Naz positions itself as one who 
could be a mentor and coordinator for other more grassroots NGOs in a more 
deliberately systematic and institutionalized voluntary sector. “Intermediary” or 
“support” NGOs, in contrast to grassroots NGOs, had two main advantages. 
Employing staff who were well versed in national and international development 
issues, they would be able to understand “the full spectrum of service 
organisations.” They also facilitated connections between other voluntary 
organisations, governments, funding bodies and research institutions. The Naz 
proposed that it serve as an intermediary NGO. It would take four “nodal 
agencies” in various districts under its wing, training them in issues such as “The 
Experiences of Positive People in India” and “Sensitivity to High Risk Groups” 
and supporting them as they carried out their activities.  
 
IV. The Rockefeller Foundation and the Debt 
for Development Coalition: American 
Philanthropies and the Debt Crisis?  
 
Finally, while my main focus at the Rockefeller Archive Center for this research 
trip was primarily the Ford Foundation due to their vested interest in Indian civil 
society, the Rockefeller Foundation was also active in global AIDS. It is well 
known that the Foundation led the way in forming global public-private 
partnerships for vaccine research such as the International AIDS Vaccine 
Initiative (IAVI) through the initiative of Seth Berkley, then researcher with the 
Rockefeller’s Health Sciences Division.95 This is another important piece of the 
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history of global AIDS, in which a private American foundation initiated a unique 
model for international public-private collaboration in vaccine research in the 
1990s. This is because many other foundations, Ford being a prime example, 
were more interested in social issues rather than bio-medically focused vaccine 
research (interestingly, both sides claim that these are under-addressed aspects) 
and few successfully reached out to collaborate with national governments, 
multilaterals and for-profit pharmaceutical companies. This raises some 
questions about the precedents for American philanthropies active later in global 
AID like the Gates Foundation and the Clinton Foundation.  
In addition to this, the Rockefeller Foundation worked with the Ford Foundation, 
the International Development Research Centre and the John Merck Fund to 
create the AIDS and Reproductive Health Network in 1988.96 I also confirmed as 
was stated in the 1987 “The AIDS Challenge” that the Foundation funded 
research on behavioural aspects of transmission in African and Latin American 
countries and was a key actor in funding the research that constructed the 
“epidemiological profile of AIDS” in developing countries. Though I have not 
investigated these earlier activities in systematic detail, I do know that the 
Rockefeller Foundation supported social scientific research on sexual risk 
behaviour in Costa Rica in 1991. In a series of correspondences between 
Leonardo Mata, Professor at the Institute for Investigations in Health (INSA) and 
Dr. Scott Halstead, Director of the Rockefeller Health Sciences Division, Mata 
makes the case for the prevention-policy relevance of his research which 
proposed to study knowledge, attitude and practices in regards to human 
sexuality in Costa Rica at a national level, using an innovative “anonymous 
ballot” system to interview people who were not comfortable with talking about 
sensitive topics.97  
Furthermore, I also came across a very unusual Rockefeller Foundation grant to 
an NGO called the Debt for Development Coalition, which provides a fascinating 
insight into the context of American philanthropies’ understandings of how AIDS 
activities should be funded in the context of the balance of payments crisis of the 
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1980s to 1990s. The Debt for Development Coalition, Inc. was established in 
1988 as a tax exempt, 501(c)(3) not-for-profit organisation and received the 
majority of its funding from the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID). To put it in simple terms, its objective was to help NGOs 
conduct a “debt-for-development swap” in which the debts of developing 
countries could be turned into economic development opportunities using 
“innovative exchanges of debt” – what it called “Swaps Against AIDS.”98 The 
angle was that purchasing such debt would free up critical funds for Third World 
governments to invest in AIDS prevention. Interestingly, the officer questioning 
whether this organisation’s proposal was in line with the Foundation’s strategy 
does admit it was a rather complex set of financial transactions.  
This is interesting because one issue in the critical secondary literature is that 
AIDS programmes in developing countries (vertical, un-integrated with public 
health infrastructure, overfunded) are an extension of Selective Primary Care and 
are thus (a) vehicles for prescribing neoliberal ideologies in health and (b) 
ineffective in a context ravaged by structural adjustment policies. 99  This is 
because the central National AIDS Control Programme (NACP) is primarily 
funded by the World Bank, a multilateral development agency who is also the 
largest lender in health.100 The World Bank was closely tracking the data on the 
balance of payments crisis since the 1980s and corresponding with GOI officials, 
other regional development agencies like the Asian Development Bank (ADB) 
and members of the Aid India Consortium. Thus, it is a reasonable conjecture 
that their intimate involvement in the 1991 Indian debt crisis and formal 
liberalisation of the economy was at least a factor in determining the shape of the 
core National AIDS Control Programme, since at least in the case of India, the 
Bank provided the majority of funding conditional upon certain agreements in 
regards to the programme design.101  
So how did these two American philanthropies’ understandings of the debt crisis 
influence their strategy on what kinds of AIDS work needed to be done in the 
developing world? This is essentially a question of (a) where the Ford and 
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Rockefeller Foundations each saw their capabilities in developing countries and 
(b) their general approaches to how problems should be solved: as top-down or 
ground-up? grassroots or macroeconomic solutions? From this snapshot of the 
archival records, we see them taking very different tactics. It would seem that the 
Rockefeller Foundation was at least aware of the idea that AIDS prevention had 
to be seen in the context of the debt crisis. While it did not have the influence in 
macroeconomic policy making circles that multilateral agencies like the World 
Bank had, through an American non-profit with USAID funding like Debt for 
Development, it indirectly addressed AIDS as an issue of freeing up funding from 
debt repayments. To them, this was one way to solve the AIDS problem in the 
specific context of a developing country. 
On the other hand, with Ford I have seen little to no mention or engagement with 
the Indian macroeconomic scenario and how it impacted AIDS, other than to say 
that India was a developing country with diminishing resources. However, 
poverty was clearly an issue Ford was intimately familiar with. They funded two 
Indian economists to research measurements of poverty in the country in the 
early 1970s. Furthermore, Ford once was privy to high-level policy discussions in 
India, as the first Ford representative in India, Douglas Ensminger, enjoyed a 
close relationship with Jawaharlaal Nehru and the Planning Commission. This 
history needs to be investigated in more detail, but it suggests that by the time 
AIDS became a crisis, Ford had become an organisation that preferred to keep 
things small and work ground-up, identifying a need that fit with the work they 
had already been doing in the country and going from there. Rather than 
presenting themselves as authorities on matters of health as the Rockefeller 
Foundation’s International Health Division (IHD) and later the WHO did, it was 
keen to work with non-state actors, civil society and grassroots organisations 
close to the local community, building up a small system that supplemented the 
national programme, even avoiding contact with the Central Government. 
Without making generalizations, it would seem the Ford Foundation on the 
whole tended to see health as part of social development. Thus, working on social 
issues – which were conceptualized around a core concept of poverty – 
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surrounding a particular disease would result in improvements in health. This 
theme needs to be teased out better, but for me, this case of the Rockefeller 
Foundation and the Debt for Development Coalition in contrast to Ford’s work 
adds more depth in historicizing global AIDS. It introduces more themes we have 
to consider: multilateral vs. national government vs. private philanthropy, 
grantmaking vs. health project lending, social vs. biomedical, top-down vs. 
ground-up health, health as a result of or as a catalyst for development, and social 
development vs. macroeconomic development. 
 
V. Conclusions and Implications of Findings 
for Project 
 
When I initially wrote my proposal detailing why Ford’s grants to Indian AIDS 
NGOs at the Rockefeller Archive Center (RAC) were important for my project, my 
interests were more India-focused. I stated that I wanted to understand how 
these NGOs presented their need for Ford funding. Given the national context of 
the health sector reforms of the 1990s, the privatization and NGO-isation of 
public health and the vertical orientation of the Indian National AIDS Control 
Programme (NACP), how did these NGOs make a case for the importance of their 
work to a foreign grantmaker? After researching the records at the RAC, I have a 
much more nuanced understanding of how involved Ford was in, not just 
supporting, but also initiating and directing the Indian NGO sector’s AIDS 
activities through their grantmaking. Given their early involvement before the 
1992 scale-up, this has significant implications concerning how the discourse 
surrounding the epidemic’s impact in the country developed. It also goes some 
way to explain the critique that Indian public health professional have had of 
both the NACP and civil society “AIDS-wallas” work – that it is divorced from the 
reality of the health sector reforms and un-integrated with the existing health 
infrastructure. While taking into account the initiative and agency of these NGOs 
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before Ford got involved, this raises the question of: to what extent did the 
Foundation’s social development orientation establish the discursive framework 
within which India’s AIDS NGOs situated their activities, especially considering 
they were one of the first international agencies active in India until 1992?  
These records also showed that Ford had a distinct strategy and rationale for why 
social development issues should be strongly promoted in the civil society sector: 
partly due to practical issues (like resources, existing portfolio, work others were 
doing and not wanting to work with national governments), but also due to a 
genuine belief in promoting socially progressive programs and organisations. 
This is evident from the kinds of organisations and people they were talking to. 
While this information needs to be balanced with interviews and archival data in 
India, this was a key finding. It also raises more questions: if Ford was active in 
African (Kenya) and Latin American (Brazil) countries before India, given their 
(and everyone else’s) lack of experience with AIDS, did they export their findings 
in these locations to India? Or did they build more from their expertise and 
understandings of Indian society due to their long relationship since 1952, and if 
so, how? Furthermore, how exactly did the Ford-supported NGOs exist alongside 
the NACP and the National AIDS Control Organisation (NACO) after 1992 and at 
various stages of the programme’s phases? This is pertinent as the NACP 
increasingly decentralized at the behest of the Bank to reflect the fact that health 
was a state matter in India and there were significant efforts from within NACO 
to mainstream AIDS with the health infrastructure and other 
disease/reproductive health programs. 
In addition to this, I have found a wealth of archival information about the Ford 
Foundation’s contributions to the global AIDS response. It has shown how 
uncertain and fluid this terrain was in the early years. The complete ownership of 
the global response by the WHO with its Special and then Global Programme on 
AIDS (SPA and GPA) was contested by representatives of developing countries 
and private philanthropies like Ford. As those in the UN and Bretton Woods 
systems responded to such critiques and built up collaborative responses (first 
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WHO and UNDP, then WHO and World Bank and finally UNAIDS in 1996), Ford 
forged its own path. This has opened up many areas of contextual knowledge that 
my project could build upon as it is clear to me that this slice of Ford’s AIDS 
activities in India is part of many other narratives that need to be historicized. 
One area is the history of American philanthropies’ involvement in global health, 
in which much of the critical secondary literature focuses on organisations such 
as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation or the Clinton Foundation who were 
active later in the global epidemic.102 Less is known of the activities of this earlier 
generation of foundations, barring Jennifer Brier’s research on Ford’s 
relationship with Brazilian AIDS NGOs. 103  Did the Ford and Rockefeller 
Foundations set (or re-set) the precedent for how a private US philanthropy 
could be involved in a global epidemic response in the late 20th century?  
Another related area is a balanced understanding rich in archival evidence of how 
the concepts of multisectorality, a united “global response” and AIDS as more 
than a biomedical issue came about. The Ford and Rockefeller Foundations are 
part of a larger group of global and regional actors involving multilateral 
international organisations such as the WHO and the World Bank, new initiatives 
like UNAIDS and the Global Fund, bilateral donors like PEPFAR, USAID and the 
development agencies of other nations, particularly those in northern Europe. In 
the literature these organisations produce, they present themselves as part of one 
global “team effort,” bringing their various talents to the same table and 
reinforcing each other’s positions. Collaboration and coordination to avoid 
overlap is a key theme in the history of the global AIDS response particularly in 
the early years. Within this, Ford’s social development orientation as a part of 
AIDS prevention strikes a significant contrast to the “magic bullet” disease 
control programmes of the 1950s and 1960s – and yet they did not address 
macroeconomic issues or engage with the question of health as part of economic 
development, despite their understanding of poverty and its connections to 
health in India. So how did this approach to addressing a global epidemic – by 
everyone at all levels and from all sides – develop and what was it a response to? 
And exactly how collaborative was it? 
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My findings from the archival research have been presented chronologically and 
according to source type rather than organised under themes. This is because I 
did not want to flatten the “dimensionality” of the sources and their rich potential 
for historical analysis. As a historian of global health, I often work with officially 
published policy literature of health organisations and development agencies and 
these records (on a contemporary topic no less) provided a refreshing and 
grounded perspective on the unfolding of an unprecedented global epidemic. In 
some cases, I found full copies of policy documents, research publications and 
news articles, which signalled when they were consulted and significant in policy 
circles. In the grant records, I found follow-up reports containing documents 
such as instructions for games with local teenagers that were used in health 
education activities, showing a glimpse of the day-to-day workings of an Indian 
AIDS NGO in the 1990s. By allowing me to trace the narrative of one organisation 
consistently, these records have provided me with traction and focus in my 
current research questions but also raised a multitude of new ones. In sum, the 
rich primary sources of the Ford Foundation held at the Rockefeller Archive 
Center – from the reflective internal accounts, the handwritten notes, the 
correspondences, the supporting documents in follow-up reports submitted by 
grant recipients and the rougher “footprints” of articles and reports gathered – 
reveal critical insights into the process behind the global AIDS response and how 
it played out in India from the viewpoint of one American philanthropy.  
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